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Abstract
In this paper we attempt to recover an integrated conception of the Precautionary Principle
(PP). The α= .05 inferential-threshold convention widely employed in science is ill-suited to the
requirements of policy decision making because it is fixed and unresponsive to the cost trade-offs
that are the defining concern of policy decision making. Statistical decision theory – particularly
in its Signal-Detection Theory (SDT) variant – provides a standard framework within which
to incorporate the (mis)classification costs associated with deciding between intervention and
non-intervention. We show that the PP implements preventive intervention in precisely those
circumstances where the SDT-based model yields a (1,1) corner solution. Thus the PP can be
understood as a heuristic variant of the SDT corner solution, which in turn serves to patch the
incongruity between the inferential practices of science and the inferential requirements of policy
decision making. Furthermore, SDT’s analytical structure directs attention to a small number of
variables – (mis)classification costs and prior probabilities – as determinants of the (1,1) corner
solution. Subjective biases impinging upon these variables – omission bias, protected values, and
the affect heuristic in particular, moderated by the decision maker’s industry-aligned (insider)
or industry-opposed (outsider) status – combine within SDT to successfully retrodict features
of the PP previously considered puzzling, if not inconsistent or incoherent. These psychological
biases do not exclude, and may in part reflect, the decision maker’s deontological moral beliefs,
or indeed social norms embodied in the nation’s legal system (common law vs. civil law).
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Precautionary Principle (PP) is commonly framed as being applicable only to problems
that lack reliable quantitative information.(1) Accordingly, contemporary formalizations of the
PP are predicated upon Knightian uncertainty, also known as ambiguity, which is distinguishable
from risk in being characterized by multiple irreducible priors.(2) Thus it might appear that the
PP’s domain of applicability excludes the case of risk – that is, uncertainty representable with a
unique probability distribution – and the very environmental- and health-hazard questions upon
which scientific research is rapidly generating petabytes of quantitative information.1
In this paper we develop a complementary framework within which the PP retains a role even
in the presence of (i) scientific research generating quantitative information and (ii) uncertainty
representable with unique, if possibly high-dispersion probability distributions. The intellectual
ancestry of this undertaking may be traced back to early decision analyses of hazard policy.(4–6)
We demonstrate that the PP may be understood as a post-hoc patch of the incongruity
between the nature of information generated by current scientific practice on the one hand, and
the form that this information needs to be processed into for policy decision-making purposes, on
the other. Current scientific practice gives pivotal prominence to statistical significance testing
and the convention – often a de facto hurdle to publication – of applying inferential procedures
that discretize results into either ‘significant’ or ‘non-significant’ categories with reference to the
fixed statistical significance level α = 0.05.
At its simplest, policy action or inaction is also discrete. Policy decision making thereby
also requires summative discretization of the evidence, namely into the categories ‘interven-
tion required’ or ‘intervention not required’. However, whereas in science the Neyman-Pearson
lemma determines the accepted combination between power (1− β) and test size (α), in policy
decision making the costs associated with misclassification – and the trade-offs between dif-
ferent misclassification costs – cannot be ignored. Policy decision making therefore requires
incorporation of these trade-offs, which analytically equates to the determination of an optimal
combination of test size and power (α∗, 1 − β∗) that reflects problem-specific misclassification
costs. Signal-Detection Theory (SDT) – a binary classification framework in the tradition of
Abraham Wald’s statistical decision theory(7,8) – integrates these problem-specific costs by de-
1For instance, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) archives more than a
petabyte (a quadrillion, or 1015 bytes) of new data each year. NOAA projects that the total volume of environ-
mental data held in its archives will rise to 140 petabytes by 2020.(3)
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sign. Where the costs associated with false negative errors are sufficiently large relative to the
remaining misclassification costs, optimally determined test size and power (α∗, 1 − β∗) yield
intervention/no-intervention classifications that are observationally equivalent to the post hoc
application of weak PP. Whereas public policy discourse cannot reliably sustain explicit appli-
cation of SDT – such are the analytical and complexity limitations of public policy discourse – it
can and does support application of the more straightforward, weak-form PP. In this sense, the
weak PP serves to patch, rather than remedy, the mismatch between the scientific community’s
inferential practices and the requirements for policy making.
Yet human decision making under risk and uncertainty does not consist of cold, rational
calculation alone. Instead emotions, heuristics and psychological biases are also involved, and
these impact upon the way in which the PP is formulated and applied. In this sense, one can
view particular PP features as projections of these psychological factors. Here we highlight the
effects of omission bias,(9–19,23,27) protected values,(22–27) and the affect heuristic(28–34) upon the
SDT-based model of the PP. These psychological factors crucially influence (i) which potential
targets for PP application fall into policy focus, (ii) the development of PP variants, and (iii)
the adoption of these variants by disputing interest groups, leading to sharp discord in public
policy discourse.
Cass Sunstein argues that the PP fails to satisfy a basic self-consistency requirement.(35)
This reprises and refines John Graham’s and Frank Cross’ observation that the PP should itself
be subject to examination for countervailing risks.(6,36,37) A self-consistent PP application would
not only prevent the risk of harm from industry’s actions, but would also require prevention
of second-round risk of harm arising from the act of preventive intervention. But in practice,
PP-predicated prevention of harm is truncated after the first-round preventive intervention.
In this sense, PP-based preventive intervention is in practice not uniformly deployed across
impact-round iterations. Neither, however, is the PP uniformly deployed at the macro level
either. With regard to honeybee Colony Collapse Disorder (CCD) for instance, the PP is in-
voked against neonicotinoid pesticides, but not against other, ostensibly important contributing
factors: agricultural intensification, habitat loss and fragmentation, pathogens, parasites, and
other environmental changes.(38) These apparent inconsistencies are rendered comprehensible –
and indeed predictable – within a behaviorally augmented SDT framework.
More than 20 PP definitions are in use, ranging from weak PP through to strong PP and
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super-strong PP. PP-definition variegation reflects the asymmetries of omission bias, protected
values, and the affect heuristic. These asymmetries couple with interest-group internal structure
as well, whereby each interest group’s members coalesce around particular PP variants rather
than others.
In the sequel we develop a behaviorally augmented SDT model of the PP, which successfully
explains heretofore puzzling features of the PP. First we show how SDT-based optimal cutoff
thresholds can be used to bridge the gap between scientific inferences and the inferences required
for policy decision making. Then we show how the PP serves as an easily-understood ‘patch’ that
implements the same preventive-intervention decisions as would be implemented under optimally
determined SDT corner solutions. Finally, we turn to an investigation of how omission bias,
protected values, and the affect heuristic impact upon the SDT model to make the preventive-
intervention replicating corner solution more – or less – likely.
2 VARIETIES OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Of the twenty definitions of the PP in existence, we focus here on three key spinal points in an
ascending scale of stringency: weak PP, strong PP, and super-strong PP.
The PP emerged from Germany in the late 1970s as part of the country’s response to
large-scale environmental problems including acid rain, pollution of the North Sea, and climate
change.(39) Section VII of the Ministerial Declaration announced in London at the conclusion
of the 1987 Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea included the
following statement of the PP:
Accepting that, in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of
the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may
require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been
established by absolutely clear scientific evidence.(40)
But the most widely known variant of the PP was adopted as Principle 15 of the 1992 UNCED
Declaration on Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration):
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious
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or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.(41)
This is regarded as the definitive articulation of the weak PP. A slightly more verbose restatement
of it appears in Article 3 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Under this weak variant of the PP, there is no mention of which party bears the burden of proof.
A strong PP variant was articulated in the Wingspread Consensus Statement on the Pre-
cautionary Principle (the Wingspread Statement), which was signed by all 32 scientists, philoso-
phers, lawyers and environmental activists who participated in the Science and Environmental
Health Network’s January 24–26 1998 Conference on the Precautionary Principle held in the
Wingspread Conference Center, Racine, WI:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, pre-
cautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are
not fully established scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather
than the public, should bear the burden of proof.2
Unlike the weak PP, the strong PP (i) does not mention costs, (ii) does not acknowledge that
different states have different levels of resources (‘capabilities’) available for environmental pro-
tection, and (iii) does not limit preventive intervention to threats of serious or irreversible harm.
The strong PP employs the operative word ‘should’, which can refer to either the moral duty
(moral imperative) for action, or the moral desirability of action. Hence from the text of the
strong PP alone, it is not clear (a) whether preventive intervention is called for as a moral,
categorical imperative, regardless of the direct and indirect (opportunity) costs of implementing
preventive intervention, or (b) whether preventive intervention is called for as being desirable,
yet subject to the practical direct- and indirect-cost trade-offs within the totality of obligations
involved in running a nation state, given its resources and degree of economic development.
From context we may infer that Wingspread Conference attendees intended the former, moral-
imperative interpretation. But this is not evident from the text of the Wingspread Statement
alone. Finally – yet crucially – the strong PP explicitly imposes the burden of proof on the
proponent of an activity.
The super-strong PP precludes aforementioned ambiguity by specifying not only the burden
of proof, but also the standard of proof:
2http://www.sehn.org/wing.html
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the [PP] mandates that when there is a risk of significant health or environmental
damage to others or to future generations, and when there is scientific uncertainty
as to the nature of that damage or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions should be
made so as to prevent such activities from being conducted unless and until scientific
evidence shows that the damage will not occur.(42) [emphasis added]
Thus under the super-strong PP preventive intervention is the default condition when (i) there
is a risk – any risk – of significant harm and (ii) there is scientific uncertainty over the level or
probability of that harm. The burden of proof lies with those who wish to proceed with the
potentially harmful activity. The standard of proof required by the super-strong PP is extreme,
in that preventive intervention remains in place “until scientific evidence shows that the damage
will not occur.” This is not the preponderance-of-evidence (> 50%) standard of proof employed
in US Common Law. Neither is it full conviction of the judge (90%, 95%, or 99.8%) standard
of proof employed in continental European Civil Law.(43) A literal reading of the super-strong
PP requires a 100% standard of proof to be achieved before preventive intervention may be
withdrawn.
Henceforth, references to ‘the PP’ shall be read as references to the weak-PP variant, unless
separately stipulated otherwise.
3 PP AS A PATCH
In computer science the term patch refers to retrospectively installed update code that repairs,
improves or adapts the functioning of an existing piece of software. Although not constituted
of computer software code, the PP serves as a patch in this sense, adapting the output of
scientific inferential conventions to the misclassification-cost-sensitive requirements of policy
decision making. For problems satisfying weak-PP applicability criteria, preventive intervention
decisions are thus triggered ‘as if’ they had been taken under optimally determined inferential
thresholds.
This role as a patch bridges between (a) fixed-inferential-threshold convention in science, and
(b) misclassification-cost-optimal inferential thresholds for policy decisions. We present each of
these below in turn before turning to PP as a patch.
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3.1 Scientific inferential convention: NHST
Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) is the workhorse method of statistical inference in
modern science. It combines Neyman and Pearson’s concept of a critical rejection region(44) with
Fisher’s formulation of p-values.(45) Although there are basic, pointed philosophical differences
between the developers of these two concepts,3 in modern usage these differences have been
glossed over or subsumed within a unified framework.(47,48)
That NHST has become a central preoccupation within empirical science was critically
noted already by Yates.(49) Since Yates, criticism of this preoccupation and of NHST per se
has been repeated and expanded.(50–52) John Ioannidis’ widely cited paper entitled ‘Why most
published research findings are false’ represents one culmination of this stream of criticism.(53)
Some of the strongest and most persistent critics of NHST are advocates of Bayesian statistical
methodology.(54) Nevertheless NHST remains the prevailing convention – in all but one journal
of which we are aware.4
3.1.1 The fixed α = 0.05 threshold
Fisher introduced significance testing and the concept of a p-value, i.e. the probability that a
test-statistic T = t(X),5 equals or exceeds the observed value t(x) given that the null hypothesis
H0 : θ = θ0 is true, i.e. p = P (t(X) ≥ t(x)|H0). In Fisher’s approach to significance testing,
there is no explicit alternative hypothesis under consideration. This is because there are innu-
merable different conceivable alternative hypotheses. Fisher views the alternative hypothesis –
and therefore any quantities derived from it, such as statistical power – as ‘unknown’. Although
Fisher believed that p-values require researchers’ subjective interpretation, his early expositions
advocated using p < 0.05 (i.e. a 5% significance level) as the standard for concluding that there
is evidence against H0.
[In 1925:] The value for which P = .05, or 1 in 20, is 1.96 or nearly 2; it is convenient
to take this point as a limit in judging whether a deviation is to be considered
3The distinction between ‘inductive inference’ as advocated by Fisher, and ‘inductive behavior’ as advocated
by Neyman, was at the heart of of their disagreement. Neyman advocated a theory of mathematical statistics
predicated on probability (not subjective likelihood), the basis of which is provided by “the conception of frequency
of errors in judgement.”(46,47)
4In 2015, the editors of Basic and Applied Social Psychology announced that they will be removing p-values
and other NHST measures from papers published in BASP.(55)
5computed on observed data drawn from a continuous distribution X ∼ f(x|θ) on support R
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significant or not. ... ...We shall not often be astray if we draw a conventional line
at 0.05 ... .(56)
[In 1926:] Personally, the writer prefers to set a low standard of significance at the
5 percent point, and ignore entirely all results which fail to reach this level.(57)
[In 1935:] It is usual and convenient for experimenters to take 5 percent as a standard
level of significance, in the sense that they are prepared to ignore all results which
fail to reach this standard... .(58)
Fisher viewed the p-value as an index of the ‘strength of evidence’ against H0. Fisher’s approach
to significance testing thus focuses on controlling type-I error alone. Although in his later work
Fisher attacked the notion of a standard or conventional threshold for type-I error, empirical
researchers continue to employ the α = 0.05 level suggested by Fisher. Fisher’s influential texts
included tabulations of exact small-sample X 2-, t- and F -test statistics. He economized on
page-space and enhanced the usability of his tables by providing only selected quantiles, key
among which being the 5% quantile. Neyman and Pearson followed suit in endorsing a fixed 5%
level – and in turning their attention to controlling type-I error and in developing their method
around a ‘rule of behavior’ – under the influence of Fisher’s 5% and 1% quantile tables.(47)
Neyman and Pearson held that one could only test a null hypothesis against an alternative
hypothesis. Thus Neyman and Pearson were concerned with type-II error as well as type-I error.
Following this concern, they introduced the concept of statistical power. They sought to supplant
the subjective element present in Fisher’s approach with a formalized decision procedure (a
behavioral rule) embodying the frequentist principle: “In repeated practical use of a statistical
procedure, the long-run average actual error should not be greater than (and ideally should
equal) the long-run average reported error.”(48) Neyman and Pearson sought to distinguish their
theory from Fisher’s ‘significance testing’, and did so by referring to their formalized decision
rule as ‘hypothesis testing’.
Statement 3.1 (Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing).
(i) Derive type-I and type-II error probabilities α = P (t(X) ≥ c |H0) and β = P (t(X) < c |H1)
for given for simple hypotheses H0 : θ = θ0 and H1 : θ = θ1 where X ∼ f(x|θi), i = {0, 1},
θ1 > θ0, and c is a critical threshold in the codomain of t(·);
8
(ii) Determine the most powerful test (in particular its critical threshold c) and the most ap-
propriate type-I error probability α∗ using α = P (t(X) ≥ c |H0), β = P (t(X) < c |H1),
X ∼ f(x|θi), and the costs associated with type-I and type-II errors;
(iii) Use the pre-chosen critical value c to reject H0 if t(X) ≥ c, else accept H0.
Notice that there are two components in Part (ii) of this statement. The first is the de-
termination of the most powerful test. This is accomplished with the Neyman-Pearson lemma.
The second is the determination of the most appropriate type-I error probability α∗. For this,
Neyman and Pearson did not provide a formal procedure, but offered clear verbal guidance. We
elaborate the Neyman-Pearson lemma first, followed by α∗, even though the latter is technically
a required input parameter for application of the Neyman-Pearson lemma. The following pre-
sentation of the Neyman-Pearson lemma is adapted from Lehmann and Romano,(59) which may
also be consulted for the associated proof.
Theorem 3.1 (Neyman-Pearson lemma). Let there be two continuous distributions X ∼ f(x|θi), i =
{0, 1}, indexed by the parameters θ1 > θ0.
(i) Existence. For testing the simple null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 against the simple alternative
hypothesis H1 : θ = θ1, there exists a test function φ and a constant k > 0 such that
Eθ0φ(X) = α (3.1)
and
φ(x) =


1 if f(x|θ1)
f(x|θ0) > k
0 if f(x|θ1)
f(x|θ0) < k
(3.2)
(ii) Sufficient condition for a most powerful test. If φ satisfies (3.1) and (3.2) for some constant
k, then φ is Most Powerful (MP) for testing H0 against H1 at level α.
(iii) Necessary condition for a most powerful test. If a test φ∗ is MP at level α, then it satisfies
(3.2) for some k, and it also satisfies (3.1) unless there exists a test of size strictly less
than α with power 1.
Although the Neyman-Pearson lemma is framed in terms of simple hypotheses, the test φ∗
can be shown to be Uniformly MP against a composite alternative hypothesis when the family
of distributions indexed by θi satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property.
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Neyman and Pearson explicitly acknowledge that the critical threshold c, which demarcates
between the null-hypothesis rejection region and the null-hypothesis acceptance region, should
be determined by the researcher. This determination is dependent upon the context:
...in some cases it will be more important to avoid the first [type-I error], in other
the second [type-II error]... ...determining just how the balance should be struck,
must be left to the investigator. ... ...we attempt to adjust the balance between the
risks [of the two types of error] to meet the type of problem before us.(44)
In this 1933 formulation, consideration of consequences – costs of error – remain implicit. With
time Neyman’s position shifted, however. In 1950 he articulated the view that controlling type-I
errors is ‘more important’ than controlling type-II errors:
Because an error of the first kind is more important to avoid than an error of the
second kind, our requirement is that the test should reject the hypothesis tested
when it is true very infrequently... ...The ordinary procedure is to fix arbitrarily a
small number α... ...and to require that the probability of committing an error of
the first kind does not exceed α.(60)
From these beginnings, inertia took hold.(61) Today, use of α = 0.05 reflects a customary,
conventional, common frame of reference:
It is customary therefore to assign a bound to the probability of incorrectly rejecting
[H0] when it is true and to attempt to minimize the other probability subject to this
condition. ... ...The choice of a level of significance α is usually somewhat arbitrary...
...Standard values, such as .01 or .05, were originally chosen to effect a reduction
in the tables needed for carrying out various test [sic]. By habit, and because of
the convenience of standardization in providing a common frame of reference, these
values gradually became entrenched as the conventional levels to use.(59)
The key feature of operating under the Neyman-Pearson lemma is accepting – as given, short
of sample-size considerations – the maximum achievable statistical power 1 − β = Eθ1φ(X)
associated with level α. This is equivalent to fixing α on the abscissa of the Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC) space, and accepting as given the associated power as indicated by the
ordinate of the ROC curve, i.e. the locus of all (α, 1 − β) points obtained parametrically by
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varying the cutoff threshold, given the distributions X ∼ f(x|θi), i = {0, 1}. Neither NHST
nor the Neyman-Pearson lemma supports any explicit consideration of trade-offs between type-I
and type-II errors.
3.1.2 Observations
The present paper is not intended to augment the general critique of NHST. Nevertheless we
flag three observations which also feature in that literature.
First, note that the α = 0.05 level is, ostensibly, arbitrary.(51,59) Section 3.1.1 traces the
broad outlines of how this convention arose, starting with the recommendations and statistical
tables of Ronald Fisher. In fact the α = 0.05 level is not a sufficiently demanding criterion that
it would identify only strong evidence against the null.
Second, modern commentators such as David Cox are in agreement with Ronald Fisher, who
held that drawing sharp distinctions between p-values such as 0.051 and 0.049 introduces an ar-
tificially sharp dichotomy.(62) Ceteris paribus, the evidential value of a study supplying a p-value
of 0.051 is virtually indistinguishable from that of a study supplying a p-value of 0.049. Applying
the labels ‘non-significant’ to the former and ‘significant’ to the latter facilitates dichotomous
thinking – where the underlying evidence does not in itself support such a distinction.
Third, ‘statistical significance’ is not synonymous with ‘scientific significance’.(62) The con-
nection with policy-making relevance is even more tenuous. For instance observational studies
can achieve statistical significance by virtue of sample size, but the effect size may be miniscule,
contributing little to overall scientific understanding or to the understanding of effective policy
levers for decision making.
However, as we show in the following section, these three detractions lose force when a fixed
α is abandoned in favor of a contextually optimal inferential threshold α∗.
3.2 Optimal inferential thresholds for policy decisions
Some of the problems inherent in NHST as currently practiced can be addressed through incor-
poration of a context-dependent loss function into the determination of an appropriate α level to
be used within the Neyman-Pearson lemma. Among the numerous approaches to incorporating
error costs into statistical inference, the simplest – and one which has the advantage of being
consistent with Neyman and Pearson’s frequentist approach – is known as Signal Detection The-
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ory (SDT).(63–65) The core elements of SDT, in addition to the above-mentioned ROC curve,
are (i) the misclassification cost matrix, (ii) the objective function under which the inferential
threshold is to be optimized, and (iii) the population prevalence rates of the conditions captured
in H0 and H1 respectively, i.e. the parameters in frequentist statistics which correspond to
Bayesian prior probabilities for H0 and H1.
We begin by introducing the confusion matrix, entries of which consist of True Positives
(TP), False Negatives (FN), False Positives (FP) and True Negatives (TN) counts obtained from
repeated application of a specific threshold x′ (see Table 1a). It is common to re-express these
entries as row-specific (within-hypothesis) rates: TPR = TP/(TP + FN), RNR = FN/(TP +
FN), FPR = RP/(FP + TN), TNR = TN/(FP + TN). Associated with each cell of the
confusion matrix is a corresponding misclassification cost, which is independent of the value
of the threshold x′ employed to generate the confusion matrix (see Table 1b). The essence
of ‘context’ is represented via a particular set of misclassification costs. For the purpose of
presenting SDT, misclassification costs are assumed to be measured or estimated in an unbiased
manner, reflecting overall societal concerns. This entails unbiased accounting for both atemporal
(i.e. generation-specific) as well as intertemporal (i.e. inter-generational) externalities.6
Table 1: Classification matrices.
(a) Confusion matrix (counts).
Inference under x′
¬H0 H0
Actual
H1 TP FN
H0 FP TN
(b) Misclassification cost matrix.
Inference
¬H0 H0
Actual
H1 CTP CFN
H0 CFP CTN
Letting N denote the total number of observations in the (random) sample TP+FN+FP +
TN = N , then the sample-based estimates of the population prevalence rates may be written
as P (H0) = (FP + TN)/N and P (H1) = (TP + FN)/N .
With few exceptions,(66) applications of SDT are couched in terms of minimizing expected
misclassification cost. The central results of classical SDT are all derived under this expected
misclassification cost objective function. For present purposes – including those of Section 4 –
the parsimony and tractability of this objective function serve well.
The optimally chosen cutoff threshold x∗ minimizes expected misclassification costs E(C)
6Consideration of the consequences flowing from the possibility that different interest groups may face different
misclassification costs or hold different priors is deferred to Section 4.
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subject to the constrained relationship between the TPR and the FPR, which may be rep-
resented with the twice-differentiable function G : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. This function, written as
TPR = G(FPR), captures the ROC curve. As N grows larger, limN→∞ TPR = 1 − β and
limN→∞ FPR = α, which in turn are defined by
α = P (X > x′ | θ0) =
∫ +∞
x′
f(x|θ0) dx (3.3)
1− β = P (X > x′ | θ1) =
∫ +∞
x′
f(x|θ1) dx . (3.4)
The slope at a point on the ROC curve determined parametrically by x′ is given by the derivative
at the point x′ (
dP (X > x′ | θ1)
dP (X > x′ | θ0)
)
x′
=
−f(x′|θ1)
−f(x′|θ0)
= l(x′) , (3.5)
which is the likelihood ratio at x′. We assume G′ > 0 and G′′ < 0, ensuring that the monotone-
likelihood ratio condition holds.7
Solving the constrained minimization problem
min
x′
E(C) s.t. 1− β = G(α) (3.6)
gives the optimality condition
l(x∗) =
P (θ0)
P (θ1)
[
CFP − CTN
CFN − CTP
]
=
(
d(1− β)
dα
)
C¯∗
, (3.7)
which states that the slope of the cost-minimizing iso-expect-cost line at the optimal operating
point is given by the ratio of the expected opportunity cost of misclassifying a Negative to the
expected opportunity cost of misclassifying a Positive. From (3.5) and (3.7) it is also clear that
the optimality condition defines the critical likelihood ratio l(x∗), and that (3.7) is a tangency
condition between the least-cost iso-expected-cost line and the ROC curve. From (3.3) and (3.4)
7Note thatG′′ < 0 is not satisfied by arbitrary combinations of sampling distributions. When both distributions
are Gaussian, G′′ < 0 is satisfied everywhere in the support of x only when the two sampling distributions have
the same variance.(67)
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we have that
α∗ =
∫ +∞
x∗
f(x|θ0) dx (3.8)
1− β∗ =
∫ +∞
x∗
f(x|θ1) dx . (3.9)
When the cutoff threshold is optimally determined by (3.7), the associated optimal level of the
test α∗ responds to changes in misclassification costs and population prevalence rates P (θ0)
and P (θ1). Setting θ0 = 0 WLOG and furthermore assuming Gaussian sampling distributions
X ∼ N(θi, 1), i = {0, 1}, θ1 > θ0, the optimal cutoff threshold x
∗ responds to the remaining
parameters as follows:
x∗ =
1
θ1
(
ln(CFP − CTN )− ln(CFN − CTP ) + ln(P (θ0))− ln(P (θ1)) +
θ21
2
)
. (3.10)
If misclassification costs are symmetrical in the sense that CFP − CTN = CFN − CTP and the
base-rate probabilities are also symmetrical P (θ0) = P (θ1), then the optimal cutoff threshold
x∗ falls half-way between θ0 and θ1, where the two pdfs intersect f(x∗|θ0) = f(x∗|θ1). The
associated optimal operating point (α∗, 1−β∗) is that ROC-curve point that coincides with the
minor diagonal, where the slope of the iso-expected-value line is unity l(x∗) = 1. Due to the
concavity of ln(·), increasing misclassification-cost increments have a diminishing impact upon
x∗. However, the natural logarithm’s concavity and limiting value limP→0+ ln(P ) = −∞ entail
that the hypothesis with the smaller base rate has a disproportionately larger impact upon the
location of the optimal cutoff threshold. This responsiveness characteristic of x∗, α∗ and (1−β∗)
under SDT sits in contradistinction to their fixed nature under the Neyman-Pearson lemma, i.e.
1− βNP = G(0.05).
Whereas the α level is arbitrary under NHST, it is optimally adapted to base-rates and
misclassification costs in SDT. Whereas in NHST, the distinction made between p-values 0.051
and 0.049 is artificially sharp, under SDT the distinction made between p-values α∗ + 0.01 and
α∗− 0.01 is not artificial, but anchored in real-world consequences (CFP , CTN , CFN , CTP ) and
base rates (P (θ0), P (θ1)). Finally, whereas statistical significance in NHST is not synonymous
with scientific or decision-making significance, rejecting the null hypothesis under SDT’s optimal
α∗ level is, by design, synonymous with decision-making significance.
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We conclude this section by noting that the approach embodied in SDT is consistent with
David Cox’s general exhortations concerning the use of p-values.
The P -value has, before action or overall conclusion can be reached, to be combined
with any external evidence available and, in the case of decision-making, with as-
sessments of the consequences of various actions.(62) [emphasis added]
3.3 PP for ‘as if’ optimal inference
In this section we show that application of the weak PP is observationally equivalent to a
particular corner solution in the SDT framework. Under the weak PP, absence of conclusive
evidence and the persistence of uncertainty does not constitute sufficient grounds not to proceed
with preventive intervention. Taking H0 : θ0 = θ to be the status-quo level of the critical index
variable and H1 : θ1 = θ (θ1 > θ0) to be the (irreversible) higher value of the critical index-
variable induced by a harmful commercial innovation, then we may note that the PP-based
policy decision (preventive intervention) is observationally equivalent to the SDT-based policy
decision associated with the corner solution in which 1−β∗ = 1 and α∗ = 1. This corner solution
obtains whenever the following condition holds.
Condition 3.1 (PP-mimicking corner-solution condition).
P (θ0)
P (θ1)
[
CFP − CTN
CFN − CTP
]
≤ lim
x′→−∞
f(x′|θ1)
f(x′|θ0)
= lim
α→1
G′d′(α) . (3.11)
The limit on the right-hand side of this inequality depends on three parameters succinctly
summarized by the discriminability index:
d′ =
θ1 − θ0
σ
. (3.12)
A given θ1 − θ0 difference can be consequentially large or consequentially small, depending on
the value of σ. Small absolute effect sizes θ1 − θ0 and large standard deviations – whether
due to limited precision of scientific measurement or due to explicit gaming of the research
process by non-independent researchers8 – are associated with small Area Under the Curve,
AUC = Φ
(
d′√
2
)
, where Φ is the standard normal CDF. Along the principal diagonal of the
ROC space, where d′=0 and AUC=0.5, the SDT-based inference performs no no better than
8fully developed treatment of which is deferred to future work
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chance, as achieved e.g. with the toss of a fair coin. Larger d′ and AUC permit improvement,
in principle, over mere chance (see Figure 1a).
The limit on the right-hand side of (3.11) may be identified in Figure 1b, which plots ROC-
curve slopes for four discriminability-parameter values (.2, .5, 1, 2). The right-hand side vertical
intercept of each d′-specific curve gives limα→1G′d′(α). Applying Condition 3.1 to Figure 1b, it
can be seen that a PP-mimicking corner solution obtains when the slope of the iso-expected-cost
line falls within the half-open interval between zero and this right-hand side vertical intercept.
For d′ = 0.2 for instance – which corresponds to questions subject to considerable scientific
or measurement uncertainty – this interval is [0, 0.5). As d′ and AUC grow larger, the upper
boundary of this corner-solution supporting interval collapses toward zero. However, for all
non-degenerate corner-solution supporting half-open intervals [0, limα→1G′d′(α)) ≡ Γd′ , Γd′ 6= ∅,
P (θ0)
P (θ1)
[
CFP − CTN
CFN − CTP
]
∈ Γd′ (3.13)
is satisfied in the region of the parameter space where the expected cost of misclassifying a
True Negative is sufficiently small relative to the expected cost of misclassifying a True Positive.
Obviously, if either P (θ1) → 1 or (CFN − CTP ) → ∞, or both, then (3.13) is satisfied. But
these extreme limits are not necessary for the corner solution. It is sufficient for the slope of the
iso-expected-value line to fall within Γd′ .
The wording of the PP selects as targets for preventive intervention those commercial inno-
vations that are characterized by a large denominator in Equation (3.13). The Rio declaration,
embodying the weak PP, focuses preventive intervention “[w]here there are threats of serious
irreversible damage...”. Here ‘threats’ refers to P (θ1), while ‘serious irreversible damage’ refers
to (CFN −CTP ). Unlike the weak PP however, strong and super-strong variants of the PP can-
not be rationalized within the SDT framework without making recourse to behavioral effects.
These effects are strong and widely felt.
4 PP AS A PROJECTION OF BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS
Whereas the analysis in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 is conducted under the assumption that parameters,
distributions and misclassification costs are independently identifiable and unique at the societal
level, here we introduce the effects of subjectivity, psychology and attendant heterogeneity.
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Figure 1: ROC curve and its slope, assuming σ0 = σ1 = 1.
(a) ROC curves; four different discriminability parameters.
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As part of this broadening of the analysis, relaxation of the frequentist interpretation allows
the formal analytical representation to incorporate heterogeneity in the prior-odds component
of the optimal cutoff threshold expression. Different people, interest groups and institutions
confront societally consequential problems with potentially very different subjective priors and
perceptions concerning the costs of different eventualities. Furthermore, psychological effects
induce or accentuate asymmetries in perceived, subjective misclassification costs, and these
asymmetries are expressed differently in different people, interest groups and institutions.
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4.1 Priors
The frequentist framework requires that the terms P (θ0) and P (θ1) in equation (3.7) be inter-
preted as base rates or population prevalence rates. Relaxing this requirement, allowing these
terms to be viewed as priors, expands SDT’s scope to embrace larger, longer-term, prospective
societal and planetary challenges. It also permits heterogeneity between individuals and interest
groups in the priors they hold. This is the case even without invoking behavioral biases. Con-
ceptual reorientation away from frequentist base rates and toward (possibly subjective) priors
is a prerequisite to bringing behavioral considerations to bear upon SDT.
Many of the consequential and controversial long-term societal, environmental, and planetary
issues facing humanity are largely prospective in nature. We do not have access to dozens or
hundreds of earth replicas that underwent hydrocarbon-fueled industrialization so that we can
establish the relative frequencies of those worlds on which catastrophic global warming took place
and those worlds on which global warming proved to be benign. Anthropogenic global warming,
like many other large- and smaller-scale threats, is a new emergent problem, rather than one
that has been experienced many times before, and for which a gold-standard test exists. For this
reason, a conception of probability that is restricted to conveying relative frequency information
is ill-suited to many of the most challenging problems to which the PP is being applied.
The priors P (θ0) and P (θ1) are most appositely understood in broadly Bayesian terms,
representing the state of knowledge or belief, integrating and summarizing available evidence.
Following Leonard Savage, “Probability measures the confidence that a particular individual has
in the truth of a particular proposition...”.(68) Reasonable individuals who conform with Savage’s
seven postulates (axioms) may hold different degrees of confidence in a particular proposition,
even after having viewed precisely the same body of evidence. Thus, another consequence of
abandoning the frequentist framework is the need to recognize and embrace the underlying
heterogeneity of subjective probabilities. Heterogeneity without discernible differentiation or
distinction does not lend itself to enlightening analysis, however. But behavioral factors –
specifically ‘affect heuristic’ effects discussed in Section 4.4 – systematically shape subjective
priors in ways that are consequential for an understanding of the discord that attends PP-based
preventive intervention.
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4.2 Omission bias
Consider a choice setting in which a decision maker is confronted with two alternatives. Both al-
ternatives lead to the same, objectively identical negative outcome. The first alternative involves
passively letting nature take its course, i.e. inaction in the sense of omission of separate observ-
able action. The second alternative involves taking an explicit, observable action. Omission bias
is the tendency to favor the first (omission, inaction) alternative over the second (commission,
overt action) alternative.(9–19,23,27)
In certain circumstances, the distinction between harm by omission and harm by commission
is not purely moral or psychological. Omission may result from ignorance or an attention
budget deployed across other considerations, while a responsible act of commission requires
effort and conscious intent, which cannot be predicated on ignorance or limited attention. If
on the other hand knowledge, intent and consequences are the same in the case of harm by
omission as in the case of harm by commission, there should be no consequentialist grounds for
distinguishing between the passively permitted harm and the actively chosen harm. For this
reason, some authors add a rider that restricts omission bias to being an overgeneralization of
distinctions between commissions and omissions to problem settings in which these distinctions
are absent.(9,10)
Omission bias as an empirical regularity has proven robust in replication studies, both in the
laboratory and in the field. Empirical studies have been situated in the context of risky medical
treatments,(9–11,14,15) financial decisions,(12,13) professional sports refereeing,(16) civil litigation
(standard of proof),(17) risky (conditional probability) lotteries,(18) Tax Credit repayment,(19) and
human or animal deaths.(23,27) Carefully designed studies have disentangled the omission-bias
effect from status-quo bias,(12) and normality bias.(14) This body of evidence notwithstanding,
there has been some work critical of the concept,(20) and other work arguing that omission is a
strategy choice (with plausible deniability) rather than a psychological bias.(19,21)
Factors ranging from feelings of regret to moral and ethical principles have been offered as
explanations for the empirical instantiation and prevalence of omission bias. In consequentialist
ethical systems – such as utilitarianism – the personal and moral assessment of choices is based
solely on the outcomes yielded by those choices. Consequentialist moral assessment excludes
the intent of the decision maker, the moral character traits of the decision maker, the nature
of the choice process, and the manner in which choices implement final outcomes (e.g. action
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or inaction). Indeed, consequentialist moral assessment excludes all aspects of a decision prob-
lem save the final outcomes. In contrast, deontological ethical systems assess choices without
reference to final outcomes. Under deontological ethics, proscribed types of action choices are
not rendered morally acceptable regardless of any possible positive outcomes – and regardless
of their magnitude, whether measured in absolute terms or in relative terms – that they bring
about. Instead, choice is guided by moral rules and moral duty. Furthermore, some kinds of
action choices are strictly permitted, regardless of whether they are outcome dominated by other
potential action choices.
Omission bias would not be observed within a purely consequentialist decision-making frame-
work. The psychology of regret(69) and the distinction between direct and indirect causation(14)
are the primary lenses through which we will understand omission bias in the present paper.
Even though we largely eschew moral philosophy – leaving this to those with competence to
address the profound philosophical issues involved – it is also clear that empirically observed
omission bias and the underlying regret aversion may derive in part from deontological moral
duty such as, “Above all, do no harm.”(13,26,27)
Common law distinguishes between acts, which one is liable for, and omissions, which one is
generally not liable for. A manufacturer owes its customers a duty of care, and is liable for harm
caused by its products. However, a manufacturer is not liable for the harm that could have
been prevented if it had produced a particular product – pharmaceutical companies are not held
liable for not producing specific vaccines, or for not producing treatments for particular diseases
(e.g. orphan diseases).(70) This asymmetry also holds for individuals. Under common law, there
is no general legal duty for a bystander to warn, prevent or assist an individual in peril.9 A
bystander can watch a child drown, or a blind man walk into the path of an oncoming vehicle,
and not be held to account.(71) However, if an individual has created a hazardous situation that
has placed another person in peril, then the legal duty to rescue does exist. Whether this legal
duty exists or not, the rescuer can be held liable for injuries caused by ill-advised actions during
the rescue attempt.10
In a classic application of decision analysis, Ronald A Howard, James E Matheson, and D
Warner North evaluated whether the U.S. government should seed hurricanes with silver iodide
9In contrast, under civil law as in e.g. continental Europe and Quebec, it is a criminal offence not to assist an
individual in an emergency.
10Good-Samaritan laws, passed in many US states, limit the extent of this liability.
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to reduce their intensity and thereby attenuate their destructive force.(4) The analysis reveals
that when a hurricane is seeded by the U.S. government, the damage it causes ceases to be purely
of a ‘natural disaster’ variety. Intervening in the development of a storm alters who subsequently
suffers damage and losses, and those conducting the intervention (seeding) become responsible
– morally and politically, perhaps even legally – for the damage that would not have occurred
without the seeding intervention (even though it is not possible to definitively determine who
these people are). The decision analysis thus has to factor in the ‘government responsibility
cost’ associated with the seeding. The analysts conclude that there is no firm legal basis for
operational seeding of hurricanes, that the sovereign immunity enjoyed by government is only
partial and unpredictable protection, and that there are substantial grounds for individuals to
recover damages where it can be proven that seeding caused harm.
4.2.1 Effect on misclassification costs
Outsider perspective: From an industry outsider’s perspective, the industry’s decision to
introduce an innovation is seen as a deliberate act. The potential harms from this act of
innovation are therefore weighted more heavily than any harms that would occur in the absence of
the deliberate introduction of the innovation, i.e. by omission of this innovation. Consequently,
the expected cost of misclassifying a positive (i.e. of classifying as non-harmful an innovation
that is in fact harmful) is biased upward relative to the expected cost of misclassifying a negative
(i.e. of classing as harmful an innovation that is in fact not harmful). This biases the slope of
the iso-expected-value line downward, making it more likely to fall within the interval Γ where
the SDT corner solution obtains.
Insider perspective: For industry, periodic if not continual innovation is a natural part
of its very existence. Hence the salient act is not innovation, but the decision to implement
protective intervention. Just as in both civil litigation(17) and professional sports refereeing,(16)
the harm associated with mistakenly undertaking this act is overweighted relative to the harm
associated with mistakenly omitting to undertake this act. Consequently, the expected cost of
misclassifying a negative (i.e. of classifying as harmful an innovation that is in fact not harmful)
is biased upward relative to the expected cost of misclassifying a positive (i.e. of classifying as
non-harmful an innovation that is in fact harmful). This biases the slope of the iso-expected-
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value line upnward, making it less likely to fall within the interval Γ where the SDT corner
solution obtains.
4.2.2 PP target selection: Which problems?
We suggest that the distinction between omission and commission also has a bearing upon
which problems trigger PP-based preventive intervention. Consider Colony-Collapse Disorder
(CCD), in which worker bees disappear from the colony, leaving the colony unviable. The United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has identified a number of important contributory
causal factors for CCD: insecticides, agricultural intensification, habitat loss and fragmentation,
pathogens, parasites, and other environmental changes.(38) Many of these are slow-moving, long-
existing background factors that are difficult to attribute to the actions of specific entities in the
economy. Only a subset – specific types of new insecticides, such as neonicotinoids – appear as
deliberate acts by identifiable agents. Hence, these new insecticides are viewed and evaluated
according to the ‘outsider perspective’ discussed above in Section 4.2.1. Accordingly, the slope of
the iso-expected-value line is biased downward, making it more likely to fall within the interval
Γ where the SDT corner solution obtains. Conversely, the remaining factors – agricultural
intensification, habitat loss and fragmentation, pathogens, parasites, and other environmental
changes – are viewed and evaluated according to the ‘insider perspective’ discussed above in
Section 4.2.1. Accordingly, the slope of the iso-expected-value line is biased upward, making it
less likely to fall within the interval Γ where the SDT corner solution obtains.
4.2.3 PP target selection: n ≥ 2 round effects?
When preventive intervention is implemented, why are the possible harms associated with the act
of preventive intervention not themselves subject to PP-based preventive intervention? Indeed
an infinite regress of such questions can be constructed. Why are all of these n ≥ 2 round effects
not subject to PP-based preventive intervention?
The answer lies again in the distinction between the ‘insider perspective’ and the ‘outsider
perspective’, and how these become applied across the sequence of consequent harms. From
the perspective of the pro-PP faction, the n = 1 first-round effect is the result of a conspicuous
act (i.e. the industry’s innovation) with harms that are biased in accordance with the ‘outsider
perspective’, leading to an SDT corner solution and preventive intervention. The pro-PP faction
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sees the n = 2 second-round effect not as the result of an explicit preventive-intervention action,
but as merely a preservation of the state of affairs that existed prior to the industry introducing
its innovation. Being pre-existing, the pro-PP faction applies an ‘insider perspective’, which
biases the expected cost of misclassifying a negative upward and the expected cost of misclassi-
fying a positive downward. The slope of the iso-expected-value line is biased upward, making it
less likely to fall within the interval Γ where the SDT corner solution obtains. Hence preventive
intervention is also less likely. Without preventive intervention for the n = 2 second-round effect,
there are no further rounds of consequent harms.
Thus, the self-consistency violation identified by Cass Sunstein(35) is explained with an
omission-bias augmented SDT model of the PP.
4.3 Protected values
Investigation of Protected Values (PVs) started within and emerged from the omission-bias
literature.(22–27) PVs are rooted in deontological ethical principles, and may reflect personal or
social norms. The defining characteristic of PVs is their absolute resistance to trade-offs: they
are in this sense ‘protected’ from being subject to trade-offs with other values or attributes.
This means that no amount of compensating benefit will induce an individual to make even a
small sacrifice to her PV. For an individual who views ecosystem life as sacrosanct (i.e. a PV),
there is no finite amount of compensating economic gain that could justify the extinction of a
single species. In terms of utility, PVs are associated with vertical – infinite Marginal Rate of
Substitution (MRS) – indifference curves.11
The protection in PVs is afforded against acts, not omissions, and against trade-offs with
gains in other values, not losses. The protection in PVs is absolute and non-compensatory.12
Omission bias is stronger in people with PVs.(23,24) Because PVs are seen as personal, agent-
relative moral obligations, attempts to forcibly induce diminution of a PV often triggers anger
or moral outrage.
The PVs held by individuals not aligned with industry thereby amplify the omission-bias
effect in the ‘outsider perspective’ as elaborated in Section 4.2.1. Furthermore, if the SDT
model of the PP is applied to an innovation that threatens to harm a PV, the implicit cost
11If the PV is instead represented on the vertical axis, then the associated indifference curves are horizontal,
and have zero MRS.
12Being non-compensatory, it is inconsistent with the continuity assumption of standard utility theory.
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of failing to exercise preventive intervention when it is fact warranted becomes unbounded, i.e.
CFN →∞. Consequently, the denominator in (3.13) explodes while the numerator remains finite,
which together ensure that the SDT corner solution obtains, triggering PP-based preventive
intervention to actively protect the PV. The slope of the iso-expected-value lines approach zero
as CFN → ∞, meaning that the corner solution – and preventive intervention – is supported
for all G′(1) > 0. Whereas omission bias increases the probability of a preventive-intervention
supporting corner solution, PVs guarantee it for all ROC curves satisfying G′(1) > 0.
For individuals who are aligned with industry, the effect is reversed: PVs – concerning
free enterprize, the national importance of an industry, or merely profits and employment –
amplify the omission-bias effect in the ‘insider perspective’ as elaborated in Section 4.2.1. From
this perspective, it is preventive intervention that is seen as the overt act which threatens to
harm the PV, and the implicit cost of mistakenly undertaking this act becomes unbounded, i.e.
CFP → ∞. Hence the numerator in (3.13) explodes while the denominator remains finite. The
slope of the iso-expected-value line approaches infinity, and the (0,0) corner solution obtains for
all G′(0) <∞. At this (0,0) corner solution, there is zero probability of implementing preventive
intervention.
4.4 Affect heuristic
If the intensity of emotions may be represented on a spectrum, then visceral emotion is located
at one extreme, while affect – i.e. the ‘faint whisper of emotion’ – is located at the other
extreme.(34) Affect refers to either the quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (i) in feelings associated
with a stimulus, or (ii) in an experienced-feeling state. The affect heuristic in turn refers to
reliance on such feelings, which is characteristic of the intuitive, experiential, System-1 pathway
in dual-process theories of decision making.(28–34)
Whereas risk and benefit are positively correlated in nature and in the economy,13 perceptions
and judgments of risk and benefit become negatively correlated (inversely related) in the presence
of affective valence. Under positive-affect valence, high benefit is associated with low risk. Under
negative-affect valence, low benefit – or indeed harm – is associated with high risk. This is part of
the ‘risk-as-feelings’ breakthrough in psychology: that people judge risk by how they feel about
it, rather than on the basis of reasoned thought and analysis.(33) Affect influences perception
13because the coincidence of low-risk and amble benefit does not persist for long, due to scarcity brought about
by exhaustion, competition, predation, or parasitism
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and judgment directly and independently, without any pre-requisite prior priming by logical
analytical evaluation.(34)
Alhakami and Slovic’s pathbreaking study showed the empirical inverse relationship between
perceived risk and perceived benefit on a sample of 40 items, including herbicides (ρ = −.52),
DDT (ρ = −.5), asbestos (ρ = −.48), vaccinations (ρ = −.43), nuclear power (ρ = −.4), chemical
manufacturing plants (ρ = −.32), and pesticides (ρ = −.29).(28) A survey of British Toxicology
Society members confirmed that even among field experts, the affect valence perceived by the
expert mediates the strength of the inverse relationship between the hazard’s risk and benefit.(29)
Experiments have verified and extended these results. Finucane et al. showed that the inverse
relationship is strengthened in individuals subject to time pressure, who have fewer cognitive
resources available for System 2 analytical deliberation, and thereby place greater reliance on the
resource-efficient System 1 (affect-based) response.(30) And finally, Yoav Ganzach’s experiments
have shown that affect valence mediates judgments of risk and return – in the manner predicted
by the affect heuristic – for financial assets that are not already familiar to the subject.(31)
For the SDT-based model of the PP, the affect heuristic forges a link between the prior-odds
term and the misclassification-cost term in the slope expression for iso-expected-value lines.
For positive-affect valence, low prior probability is associated with high benefit – i.e. low
harm. Consequently, both the prior-probability term and the misclassification-cost term in the
denominator of (3.13) is small, entailing steep iso-expected-value lines with slopes less likely to
fall within the corner-solution interval Γ.
For negative-affect valence, high prior probability is associated with low benefit – i.e. large
harm. Consequently, both the prior-probability term and the misclassification-cost term in the
denominator of (3.13) is large, entailing flat iso-expected-value lines with slopes more likely to
fall within the corner-solution interval Γ.
The language that interest groups adopt to describe and define themselves offers an indication
as to the affect valence they are likely to associate with particular industrial innovations, e.g.
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, World Wildlife Foundation, Save the Whales, Center for
Biological Diversity, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (UK), Woodland Trust (UK),
and Frack Off (UK). Through this clear articulation of identity and identification, not only are
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particular patterns of positive- and negative-affect valence associations clearly implied, but so
is the PV status of the environment and its biological diversity, as is the ‘outsider perspective’
with regard to applying omission bias to potentially harmful industrial innovations. Although
it is not as immediately apparent from the naming conventions employed by corporations and
their industry associations, the language used by officers of these associations and firms clearly
conveys the pattern of positive- and negative-affect valence associations, the PV status of the
industry and its profits, and the ‘insider perspective’ with regard to applying omission bias to
their (potentially harmful) industrial innovations. The language used by firms’ and industry-
associations’ public-relations arms and their legal representation reinforces this pattern.
4.5 Application: PP variants
Behavioral factors also shed light on the strong-form and super-strong-form variants of the PP.
The weak PP explicitly incorporates cost and resource considerations, which permits SDT-based
optimization of the cutoff threshold. Behavioral factors are external to the weak-PP definition,
but may be incorporated into the SDT-based analysis via their impact upon perceived misclassi-
fication costs and perceived prior probabilities. In contrast, the strong-PP and super-strong-PP
definitions incorporate behavioral factors directly. These PP variants hard-code not only the
behavioral factors, but the outsider perspective in particular, directly into their definitions.
The strong-PP definition places the burden of proof on proponents of the industrial in-
novation. As such, the default state of affairs is absence (non-introduction) of the industrial
innovation. Passive omission entails continued protection from the potential harms of the indus-
trial innovation. In contrast, the overt-action alternative comprises introduction of the industrial
innovation. This is precisely the outsider perspective, which entails that omission bias reduces
the slope of the iso-expected-value lines, and thereby renders the SDT (1,1) corner solution –
i.e. preventive intervention – more likely.
The strong PP’s wording falls short of being unambiguous, however. The strong-PP def-
inition excludes all references to cost, but relies on the ambiguous term ‘should’, which can
mean either ‘morally imperative’ or ‘morally desirable’. If ‘morally imperative’ is the operative
interpretation, then cost considerations cannot impinge upon the inferential threshold, and the
strong PP can be said to embody PVs. Yet if ‘morally desirable’ is the operative interpreta-
tion, then cost considerations cannot be strictly excluded from impinging upon the inferential
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threshold, and the strong PP cannot be said to embody PVs. Thus, the strong-PP definition
hard-codes the outsider perspective of omission bias, but falls short of hard-coding the outsider
perspective of PVs.
The super-strong-PP definition incorporates a further standard-of-proof stipulation so strong
(100%) that it leaves literally no scope for trade-offs of any non-zero magnitude between harm
and any other value. In other words, the super-strong-PP definition hard-codes outsider-
perspective PVs into the policy institution. Other studies have noted that a standard of proof
requiring that harm “will not occur” is “often an impossible burden to meet.”( 35) Within the
SDT framework, however, outsider-perspective PVs yield horizontal iso-expected-value lines
and the (1,1) corner solution for all ROC curves satisfying G′(1) > 0. The associated inferential
threshold systematically classifies all cases as ‘intervention required’: preventive intervention
becomes the policy verdict on all potentially harmful industrial innovations.
5 CONCLUSION
In contrast to the classical normative use of SDT, the present work employs a behaviorally
augmented SDT model for descriptive purposes. We show that the existence of the PP need
not be understood solely as a response to Knightian uncertainty. Instead, the PP may be
understood as a mental or administrative shortcut – i.e. a heuristic – for implementing SDT
corner solutions. The NHST inferential practices followed in science are intended to hold type-I
error at the fixed, conventional level of α = .05. However policy decision making requires an
inferential threshold that reflects operative cost trade-offs. SDT solves this problem of bridging
between the practices of science and the needs of practical policy decision making. Identifying
PP-based preventive intervention with SDT’s (1,1) corner solution offers a formalization of the
PP that restricts attention to (i) a small set of variables, (ii) the psychological effects that impinge
upon subjectively perceived values of these variables, and (iii) the mathematical relationships
between these variables within SDT. Hypotheses may be derived from this framework, and its
empirical descriptive value may be tested. The behaviorally enhanced SDT model explains
(retrodicts) previously puzzling aspects of PP target selection: (i) What kinds of harm sources
attract PP-based preventive intervention?, and (ii) At what impact round, and for what reasons,
is PP-based preventive intervention truncated? The influence of omission bias on perceived
misclassification costs, moderated by insider or outsider perspective, successfully resolves these
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puzzles. Our SDT framework also offers a new lens with which to examine and understand
different definitions of the PP, upon which previous analytical models of the PP have shed very
little light. Strong-form PP and super-strong-form PP are differentiated from weak-form PP in
the extent to which behavioral factors are hard-coded directly within the PP policy institution:
not at all in weak-form PP, omission bias alone in strong-form PP, and both omission bias and
PVs in super-strong-form PP.
The SDT-based model also offers new analytical traction on the interplay between the corner-
solution supporting interval Γ and variance-enhancing non-independent research. Due to Risk
Analysis’ manuscript-length conventions, this investigation, incorporating an examination of the
PP’s effect on incentives to undertake variance-enhancing research, is deferred to the future.
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